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Abstract 
The social question has come down upon us in two different understandings. Modestly 
understood, it is about helping the needy and creating opportunities for disadvantaged 
members of society. More ambitiously conceived, by contrast, it is about extricating human 
life generally from the false necessities of market dealings. The article argues that the 
ambitious understanding is likely to become eclipsed in a transnational context. Such an 
eclipse, in turn, threatens to destabilize transnational arrangements as soon as some 
participants embrace broader ambitions. 
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1
The Social Question in a 
Transnational Context 
 
The challenge 
In his well-known essay on global justice, Thomas Nagel set out to defend the 
view that the full requirements of socioeconomic justice are inapposite where 
political authority is not centralized. The circumstances of justice rather 
presuppose acts and relations bearing, directly or indirectly, the imprint of 
commonly authorised sovereign power.1 It is by virtue of the common 
authorisation of a coercive structure that the claims of justice become binding 
on members of a community. Where authorisation or sufficient centralisation 
are missing, the moral texture of relations devolves to a less demanding level. 
According to Nagel, this means, in particular, that “[m]ere economic 
interaction does not trigger the heightened standards of economic justice”.2  
In light of this contention, it is all the more remarkable that Nagel believes 
that poor societies ought to be able—on moral grounds—to benefit from the 
comparative advantage of lower labour costs.3 However thinly a moral 
minimum may be conceived of at the international level, Nagel believes that 
this precept ought to be included into the set. States defending their economy 
against imports from low-wage countries are therefore seen to be committing 
a moral wrong. 
                                                        
1 See Thomas Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global Justice’ (2005) 33 Philosophy and Public Affairs 113-
147 at 120-121, 123. 
2 Ibid. at 138. 
3 Ibid. 143. 
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If correct, Nagel’s claim would be good news for the new Member States of 
the European Union. Since their share of transfer payments had been 
considerably lower for no other reason than their late, numerous and 
relatively poor admission to the club,4 the one chief redistributive mechanism 
working in their favour is wage competition.5 From Nagel’s perspective, 
allowing this mechanism to work is a requirement of political morality. Even 
if the Union, owing to its lack of sovereign power, must not be held to the full 
scope of the principle of equal concern6—and hence may permit more 
inequality of distribution than national states—these inequalities must not 
originate from nations using their power in order to protect their people from 
interstate competition.  
Such a bar on anti-competitive conduct may even be consistent with allowing 
greater economic inequality to arise within national societies. Obviously, the 
more fundamental moral minimum must trump any precept of national social 
justice. Hence, once the transnational context is taken into account, the 
demands of equality would be less exacting than they seem to be from a 
perspective that focuses on societies in isolation.  
I do not want to dispute Nagel’s views here.7 I mention them in order to 
underscore that even a philosopher who is quite sceptical of the demands of 
global justice supports a position that is commonplace among high-minded 
liberals of all persuasions. It is consistent with the intuition that those who 
                                                        
4 See Giandomenico Majone, Europe as the Would-be World Power: The EU at Fifty (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 55.  
5 See Perry Anderson, The New Old World (London: Verso, 2009) at 55. 
6 According to Nagel, ibid. at 127, 130, the full set includes rights of democratic participation, 
equal citizenship, non-discrimination, equality of opportunity, and the amelioration of unfairness 
of distribution. 
7 I add, in passing, that the view is supported by a variety of heterogeneous arguments. For 
example, according to the authorisation argument the demands of justice become applicable 
because as citizens of a sovereign state we are the co-authors of its laws. By contrast, the 
participation argument has it that “the engagement of the will that is essential to life inside a 
society” (ibid. 128) makes people responsible simply because they implicitly endorse the society 
they live in through their participation. There is a whole variety of additional arguments 
employed in this text, which I cannot discuss here. 
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benefit relatively less than others from their labour have the right to benefit at 
the other’s expense. It is as though low-wage workers incurred a sacrifice, 
however involuntary, which merits reward. Thus understood, protection 
from wage competition through the use of tariffs, quotas, or subsidies not 
only gives rise to an inefficient allocation of resources, it also constitutes a 
moral wrong. Mobilising national solidarity in order to prevent the poor from 
benefiting from the fruits of their own labour is mean. If jobs go to Mexico, 
Romania, or to the Ukraine, why bother? It is morally right. 
 
Outline 
Upon closer inspection, however, this moral intuition turns out to be less firm 
than it may appear. For example, it is not plausible why countries should be 
entitled to benefit from competitive advantages that are the result of 
widespread repression or exploitation. Allowing exploitative businesses to 
benefit from their wrongs would in fact subvert international solidarity. It 
even begs the question whether solidarity demands that organised labour in 
more affluent societies allow labourers located in other countries to benefit 
from low wages if these are also, and to a certain degree, the product of their 
own weakness. Would not strengthening labour across national bounds be 
the more attractive alternative? It seems, therefore, as though the moral 
intuition shared by both the liberal right and the liberal left is based upon the 
premise that competition rather than joint control across nations is the lex 
naturalis of labour conduct.  
It should go without saying that not only is this far from being a self-evident 
truth; it is also potentially inimical to the interests of labour. 
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It is with these doubts in mind that I would like to explore the meaning of the 
social question in a transnational context. In order to anchor the inquiry in 
what is potentially an ocean of perplexity, I would like to discuss 
transnational labour competition that has the potential to affect the larger 
fabric of co-operation among nations. The European Union is a fine 
battleground to study and used, in this article, for the purpose of illustration.  
Evidently, talking of “the social question” signals interest in conflicts that 
reflect a clash of real historical forces, and not only some general human rights 
concerns, no matter how morally meritorious they may be.8 This explains why 
the article, following a very brief historical reminder, turns to Hannah 
Arendt’s terribly puzzling claim that the social question is the nemesis of any 
project of political self-constitution. If she were right, societies haunted by this 
question would be condemned to lose their freedom, for they would be 
fatefully and fatally drawn into the maelstrom of necessity.  
The article then turns to Friedrich August von Hayek’s conjectures about how 
an international federation of states might provide an effective antidote to 
what he took to be the menace of redistribution. He believes that an 
international federation would exercise a disempowering effect on any more 
ambitious social policy. Intriguingly, the transnational context is not neutral 
vis-à-vis the social question. From Hayek’s perspective, it promises to stamp 
it out.  
What Hayek did not anticipate, however, is the disintegrating impact that 
existing social welfare states may have when they participate in such a 
federation. The effect has to do with the antithetical composition of the 
welfare state vis-à-vis the elementary precepts of a market society. Such a 
state is not merely a potential obstacle in the course of creating what Hayek 
                                                        
8 See Thomas W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilites and 
Reforms (Cambridge: Polity, 2003). 
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called an international federation, but epitomizes the attempt to overcome the 
disempowering and alienating effect of market competition by political 
means.  
The discussion of Hayek’s views will be followed, therefore, by an attempt to 
reconstruct the point of the welfare state in a manner that does not reduce it 
to the role of the residual provider of much-needed handouts. Rather, such a 
state is a resolute attempt to extricate life from the depressing shackles of 
necessity. The liberal understanding, in which social policy is tied to the 
morally legitimate demands of less fortunate members of society, is thereby 
replaced with the larger ambition that Hayek hopes to see asphyxiated. The 
welfare state extended the significance of the social question from taking care 
of the needy and integrating unruly workers to something that is of concern 
to every member of society. The social question, thus understood, is about 
what society, qua collective body, can do for each in order to mitigate the risks 
and alienating effects that originate systematically from a market society. 
What becomes of the social question when its more ambitious horizon is 
effectively eclipsed owing to the predominance of its modest counterpart? 
This question has recently arisen in the European Union. While the 
Commission and the ECJ pursue neoliberal projects aimed at reforming the 
institutions of capitalism in the Member States (for example, corporate law 
and industrial relations),9 the affected welfare states increasingly react with 
revulsion.  
The effect that the Union has had on social policy has already been studied 
along several dimensions, ranging from reconstructing a problem-solving 
                                                        
9 See Martin Höpner and Armin Schäfer, ‘A New Phase of European Integration: Organized 
Capitalism in Post-Ricardian Europe’ (2007) 07/4 MPIfG Discussion Paper 15–17. 
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gap10 all the way down to identifying the legal-political structure that 
supports the implementation of an intellectually obsolete neo-liberal elite 
consensus.11  
This article wishes to explore how the transnational context affects the 
meaning of the social question. When, in a transnational context, the merely 
modest (“taking care of the needy”) or more ambitious (“extricating life from 
the market”) understandings collide there is, evidently, no common 
understanding. Hence, it becomes increasingly unclear what the question is 
about. Consequently, it can regain its significance only if it is formulated in a 
reflexive manner, that is, with awareness that it needs to be re-articulated for 
a transnational context.  
Intriguingly, in such a context, one can engage in reflection from two different 
perspectives on society. Matters of social policy can be addressed either from 
one perspective that presupposes political units or from another one that does 
not. The difference between these perspectives—one political, the other 
cosmopolitan—is due to spatial specifications of practical reason. Their 
relevance accounts for the different views on the conflict associated with cases 
such as Viking12 and Laval13. Since much ink has been spilled on these cases 
already, the article highlights three central to this type of conflict, namely, the 
distributive question in the relations between the workforces of two countries, 
the way in which Union law deals with struggle, and, finally, the collapse of 
the public-private distinction.  
                                                        
10 See the classical statements by Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘The Joint-Decision Trap’ (1988) 66 Public 
Administration 239-278; Governing Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999) at 79. 
11 See, for example, Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘The Double Asymmetry of European Integration, Or: Why 
the EU Cannot Be a Social Market Economy’ (2009) 09/12 MPIfG Working Paper. 
12 See Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers Federation, Finnish Seaman’s Union v. 
Viking Line, [2007] ECR I-10779. 
13 See Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbudet, [2007] ECR I- 
11767. 
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In a reflexive form, the social question appears too divided against itself 
owing to warring cosmopolitan and political sensibilities, with the former 
likely to prevail over the latter. The predominance can be explained, in part, 
by the fact that the institutions in charge of managing a transnational context 
do not perceive it as a shared polity but rather as an administrative space, that 
is, a district for common problem-solving.  
I conclude that a way out of the predicament on divided understandings can 
only be found by attending to the priority of justice over the maximisation of 
welfare.  
 
Arendt 
There is no canonical definition for the term “social question”; and yet, with 
some confidence it can be said that since the nineteenth century any reference 
to it has evoked the image of impoverished and miserable working masses 
and the challenge of raising them, without thereby risking upheaval, to the 
level of fully participating members of modern society.14 What fascinates, of 
course, is the use of the collective singular, for if the social question is of 
greater significance than an array of various smaller questions then it points 
to a function that society has to serve in order not to disintegrate. 
Historically, the social question was not directly associated with 
constitutionalism, which was essentially a bourgeois project. Spectres of 
socialist revolutions aside, integrating the urban and rural working classes 
into political society apparently did not require overcoming certain 
constitutional basics. While it implicated major political choices, such as the 
introduction of general suffrage or a retreat from judicial activism, history 
                                                        
14 See Tony Judt, Ill Fares the Land (London: Penguin, 2010) 174. 
The Social Question in a Transnational Context 
 
 
8 
suggests that liberal constitutionalism has been able to survive the requisite 
accommodations. They range from the rise of modern social security 
administration to the informal establishment of corporate political structures.  
In light of such common wisdom it is all the more surprising that in her 
remarkable study On Revolution, Hannah Arendt perceived a profound 
conflict between one and the other.15 In the course of the French revolution, 
she claims, the attempt to stabilise a sphere of free civic action by 
constitutional means was undermined by how the social question asserted 
itself vis-à-vis the attempt to establish political freedom. 
Evidently, for all that is doubtful about her analysis,16 Arendt’s claim is based 
upon a deliberately narrow reading of the social question.17 According to 
Arendt, the social question is the political face of poverty. Poverty, in turn, is 
a profoundly anti-political force, for it gives rise to action in the form of its 
own negation. The poor cannot afford the luxury of choice. They are driven 
by their needs. Poverty, therefore, confronts humans with their dependence 
on the necessities of the life process. Even if man-made, poverty unleashes 
impulses that are beyond human control. When the political sphere is 
invaded by the dictate of needs, the constitution of free institutions is undone 
owing to the prevalence of irresistible urgency:18 
[T]he social question [is] what we may better and more simply call the existence of poverty. 
Poverty is more than deprivation, it is a state of constant want and acute misery whose 
ignominy consists in its dehumanizing force; poverty is abject because it puts men under the 
absolute dictate of their bodies, that is, under the absolute dictate of necessity as all men 
know it from their most intimate experience outside all speculations. It was under the 
absolute dictate of necessity that the multitude rushed to the assistance of the French 
                                                        
15 See Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (1963, reprint London: Penguin, 1990). 
16 For a perceptive critique, see Bruce Ackerman, We the People, vol. 1: Foundations (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991) at 206-212. 
17 Arendt, note 15 at 89, draws a fine line between the revolutionary pity that is felt for the lot of 
the poor and the universalisation underlying solidarity. 
18 Ibid. at 60. 
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Revolution, inspired it, drove it onward, and eventually sent it to its doom, for this was the 
multitude of the poor. When they appeared on the scene of politics, necessity appeared with 
them, and the result was that the power of the old regime became impotent and the new 
republic was stillborn; freedom had to be surrendered to necessity, to the urgency of the life 
process itself. […] It was necessity, the urgent needs of the people, that unleashed the terror 
and sent the revolution to its doom. 
This is the core of the argument. A momentous historical new beginning, 
which is the fruit of human action, becomes eclipsed and overwhelmed by 
biological necessity.19 Since the French revolution thus failed to mint into 
permanent constitutional form a new order of human choice, the social 
question turned out to be constitutionalism’s nemesis. Political action is 
surrendered to historical forces whose overpowering movement is a 
manifestation of the necessity of the life process. The urgency with which 
needs assert themselves feeds into the tenacity with which the final goal of 
want satisfaction eventually authorises even resort to dictatorial means.  
 
Hayek 
One should not quibble over Arendt’s claim before asking whether a free 
society might be able to vaccinate its constitutional system against contagion 
by necessity. Can there be a constitution that is impervious to destruction on 
social grounds?  
Arendt’s own conclusion was ambivalent and, basically, pessimistic. Political 
rule among equals presupposes the violent oppression of others who need to 
carry the burden of life for the rulers. Only modern technology, and not better 
political ideas, might be able to liberate mankind from this predicament.20 
                                                        
19 See ibid. at 112 
20 See ibid. at 114. 
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Arendt seemed to subscribe to what Daniel Bell quite perceptively calls the 
American substitute for socialism, namely, affluence.21 Poverty admits of only 
an economic, and not a political, solution.22  
Quite remarkably, a potential solution had already been presented before 
Arendt formulated the problem. In a 1939 article,23 Hayek insinuated that an 
international federal government of states is likely to rid itself of the social 
question, not owing to the gradual augmentation and expansion of 
benevolence, but by making the question structurally obsolete. A federal 
system that is international in its nature, Hayek conjectured, would put an end 
to government bailouts for ailing industries for the simple reason that there 
would not be enough popular support for aiding one region over another. 
The absence within such a system of what Mill would have called “common 
sympathies”24 among compatriots would eliminate state intervention on mere 
political grounds. Moreover, under conditions of unequal economic 
development there is unlikely to be majority support for matters such as 
limiting working time or universal compulsory unemployment insurance.25 
Hayek quite perceptively identified what would be described fifty years later 
by Scharpf as a “problem-solving gap”.26 Even if the federation had 
jurisdiction, it would lack the majority necessary for its exercise.27 What is 
more, the states themselves are not in a position to sustain high social 
                                                        
21 Quoted in Judt, note 14 at 184. 
22 I doubt, however, whether Arendt was even interested in finding a “way out”. For various good 
reasons, hers was a deeply pessimistic view of the modern world. 
23 See Friedrich August von Hayek, ‘The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism’ (1939) In 
Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1942) 255-272.  
24 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Buffalo: Prometheus Books 
1991) at 308: “A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they are united 
among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and others—which 
make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under 
the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves, or a portion of 
themselves, exclusively.” 
25 See ibid. at 263. 
26 See Scharpf, note 10 at 79. 
27 See also Friedrich August von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge, 1972) at 173. 
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standards owing to the strictures of regulatory competition,28 at any rate so 
long as protectionism is held at bay through a strong regime of negative 
market integration.29  
Any social policy that would go beyond taking care of the needy is likely to 
disappear in such a system. Hence, creating an international, rather than 
national, federal system is a core maxim of economic liberalism:30 
The conclusion that, in a federation, certain economic powers, which 
are now generally wielded by the national states, could be exercised 
neither by the federation nor by the individual states, implies that 
there would have to be less government all round if federation is to be 
practicable. […] [T]he abrogation of national sovereignties and the 
creation of an effective international order of law is a necessary 
complement and the logical consummation of the liberal program.  
Not without prescience, Hayek noted that the pursuit of core liberal values 
becomes perfected beyond the nation state where national sympathies cancel 
one another out.31 An international federation reaps the benefits of statehood, 
namely a system of law enforcement, and erases solidarity: 
That Englishmen or Frenchmen should intrust [sic] the safeguarding of 
their lives, liberty and property—in short, the functions of the liberal 
state—to a suprastate organisation is conceivable. But that they should 
be willing to give the government or a federation the power to regulate 
their economic life, to decide what they should produce and consume, 
seems neither possible nor desirable. 
Hayek concedes that at the outset an interstate federation is likely to appear 
attractive only as a peace project.32 However, as soon as such a “suprastate” 
                                                        
28 See Hayek, note 23 at 268. 
29 On such “negative” powers, see ibid. at 267. 
30 Ibid. at 266, 269. 
31 Hayek, note 23 at 265-266. 
32 See ibid at 255. 
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system begins to involve economic union,33 its additional aim is not merely 
“prosperity”34 but rather prosperity under conditions of economic liberalism. 
This means that the system will produce wealth unheeded of economic 
equality.35  
 
Disembedded peace and prosperity 
Since social policy is effectively disabled in such a system, inequality promises 
to be sustainable at the federal level as well as at the level of the states. Along 
with war, an international federation eliminates the social conflicts that are a 
major cause of war. 
Remarkably, Hayek perceives an even deeper relation between maintaining 
peace and suppressing social conflict. In his view, national solidarity is a quite 
artificial arrangement. It gives rise to the paradoxical result that people 
identify with the interests of others even where their own interests may be 
entirely unaffected. This is irrational:36 
There is no valid reason why any change which affects a particular 
industry in a certain territory should impinge more heavily upon all or 
most of the inhabitants of the territory than upon people elsewhere. 
Why should a jeweller, for example, pay more taxes in order to bail out 
compatriot coal miners who are about to be laid off unless the baker’s supply 
of coal would thereby be affected? Identification on the ground of nationality 
not only distorts the varying alignment of individual interests but also creates 
                                                        
33 The reason why it should is that without economic union the internal coherence of the 
federation would be threatened. See ibid. at 257. 
34 See J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 
244, on prosperity as one of the values of the supranational project.  
35 On liberalism as a political philosophy that is not concerned about economic inequality, see 
Steven Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1993) at 4. 
36 Hayek, note 23 at 257. 
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irrational antagonism between groups. Instead of fending rationally for their 
own interest across national bounds, people support irrationally what happen 
to be causes of insiders at the expense of outsiders:37 
[…] [E]conomic frontiers create communities of interest on a regional 
basis and of a most intimate character: they bring it about that all 
conflicts of interests tend to become conflicts between the same 
groups of people, instead of conflicts between groups of constantly 
varying composition, and that there will in consequence be perpetual 
conflicts between the inhabitants of a state as such instead of between 
the various individuals finding themselves arrayed, sometimes with 
one group of people against another, and at other times on another 
issue with the second group against the first.  
There is no tension between the pursuit of a peace project and the attainment 
of a liberal economic union. On the contrary, the goals are mutually 
reinforcing. 
If Hayek is right, a transnational economic union is not one possible context 
among others in which one might pose the social question, as though this 
question might be dealt with at the level of families, clubs, nations, or the 
international community; rather, creating a space of transnational economic 
interaction is already a reply to the social question, namely, an effort put it to 
rest, at least in any form going beyond the charitable impulse underlying poor 
laws. Raising this question in such a context would be tantamount to 
invoking the Pope’s authority in a Protestant congregation. Congregations of 
this type exist precisely to make appeals to the Pope irrelevant. 
What Hayek believes an international federation to be able to accomplish is 
nothing short of what Arendt would describe as the taming of one necessity, 
the necessity of bodily urges, with the necessity inherent in how state conduct 
is dictated by the economic interest of constituencies. The cunning long-term 
                                                        
37 Ibid. at 257. 
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result hoped for by Hayek is that members of these constituencies come to 
comprehend the irrationality of their national sympathies and find themselves 
thrown back upon their individual interest, which alone, in his opinion, is 
real. The international federation is a project of putting enlightenment into 
practice. 
 
Cosmopolitan administrative individualism 
Again, before one might rush quickly to dismiss Hayek’s observations, it pays 
to examine their philosophical significance.  
Under a transnational economic arrangement, people do not appear to see 
their social existence mediated by a place that they share with others and for 
which they jointly bear responsibility. Rather, it is political self-determination 
that is linked to such a place. Its focus rests on sustaining a common form of 
life, and this may require coming to the aid of those who are part of it. The 
normative and ontic priority of the common place over individual people is 
manifest in the significance attributed to being born into, or assimilating into, 
a society. Using a much belaboured analogy, the form of life can be likened to 
an orchestra whose sonoric signature is not affected by the occasional 
replacement of individual players over time.38 The orchestra comes first, the 
players grow into it. 
By contrast, a transnational federal space is inhabited by citizens who could 
be at home, or not at home, anywhere in the world. They do not perceive their 
own life as being tied to a place or to a tradition of inhabiting a common space 
with others. The cosmopolitan citizens of economic liberalism may find that 
                                                        
38 Bruno Walter once observed that the sound of the Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra had not 
changed even after almost two generations.   
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they have much in common with people who live in distant places and come 
to regard themselves, nonetheless, as members of the vegetarian community, 
the gay and lesbian community or the community of animal rights activists. 
Interestingly, they can conceive of themselves as members of these 
communities while living, in principle, in isolation. If they were asked what 
their political philosophy is they would likely reply that they are 
“individualists”. Life does not present them with the challenge of finding 
their own niche in the social world that they already inhabit. Rather, their 
challenge is to pick and choose the location where they can be who they want 
to be no matter what the surrounding social world is like. If they were to form 
an orchestra, the sound would vary depending on the players. The life of 
cosmopolitan individualists is essentially gated. What matters to them is not 
the larger context of their doings but rather whether it is legal to do what they 
would like to do where they are.  
The social question seems to have not much traction in this type of life. If it 
appears at all, then in the wide screen format of high-minded sentimental 
attention to global poverty. Addressing issues of this type is considered to be 
a matter of private charity.  
One may still wonder what remains for political choice and action if the social 
question loses much of its significance. What comes to mind, no doubt, are the 
morally charged issues that capture the attention of people harbouring 
universalistic moral ideas. Such issues involve questions of freedom of 
expression, abortion, binge-drinking or gay marriage. They affect humanity as 
such. But in many constitutional democracies questions of this type have 
already become the province of constitutional courts. They are addressed only 
in their shadow and mediated by a conceptual world which is commonly 
identified as a realm of expertise. Indeed, in a transnational context, as the 
example of European fundamental rights protection shows, they become part 
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of an international “conversation”.39 As a result, there is nothing left to be 
determined by a free citizenry. 
Ironically, the vision of human association that is consistent with economic 
liberalism is perfectly content with having the operation of free markets 
overseen by a wise administration of things. The regulatory void left by the 
very nearly obsolete social question is replaced with the administrative 
liberalism of risk-management and crisis-intervention. It ranges from 
economic fine-tuning and the repair of market-failure all the way down to 
“nudging” stupid people into doing the right thing on the basis of incentives 
or by channelling their conduct through irksome regulations. Of course, this 
administration would have to include some poor laws, the reason for which 
may either be charity or the long-term self-interest on the part of the 
propertied classes to anesthetise misery suffered by the lower ranks of society. 
The international federation, however, would prevent that social stabilisation 
and engineering through transfer payments (or, even better, paternalistic in-
kind donations of “good” things) could ever grow into a more ambitious 
format of social policy.  
 
The welfare state 
It must not be forgotten that economic liberalism has its own approach to 
poor relief, which is consistent, even if not co-extensive, with a very modest 
understanding of the social question. No rational liberal society would leave 
its marginalised members completely to their own devices. Rather, it would 
                                                        
39 See Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010). 
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use means-tested support in order to pacify the losers.40 Sustainable 
pacification may require, lest one produces a large and potentially unruly 
Lumpenproletariat, investing the underclass with sufficient resources to buy 
games, porn, and drugs. Once they have been engrossed by media and 
anaesthetised by pharmaceuticals it will not likely occur to them that they 
could rebel against their station. A degenerate underclass is, no doubt, the 
hallmark of a smart liberal society.  
Nevertheless, Hayek sensed correctly that any social welfare state whose 
ambition is greater than preventing unrest endorses an antithesis to economic 
liberalism. This antithesis does not, in the case of a welfare state, amount to a 
rejection of markets. Rather, it is supposed to render their operations 
compatible with human existence.  
Modern market societies expect everyone to be active and to be able to adapt to 
shifting opportunities. Agility and adaptability are indispensible where the 
calibration and satisfaction of needs is subject to the conditions of trade and 
barter.41 Both expectations, which arise from this system of needs, create a 
high risk of social exclusion for the inactive and inflexible, not least where 
inactivity and inflexibility are entirely involuntary. One can easily fall out of 
society at any time owing to ill health, accident, family stress, shifting 
demand in the labour market, loss of competitive edge, simple fatigue, 
existential boredom, old age, or other reasons of incapacitation. The 
counterfactual expectations of agility and adaptability can only be 
universalised under the condition that the bearing of the exclusion risk is 
universalised, too—not de facto, which may plausibly never be the case, but 
normatively. Everyone ought to be regarded as equally affected by an exclusion 
                                                        
40 For accurate observations along these lines, see Abram de Swaan, ‘The receding prospects for 
transnational social policy’ (1997) 26 Theory and Society 561-575 at 561-562. 
41 See G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (trans. H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991) § 188, p. 226. 
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risk that arises from the counterfactual expectation of infinite agility and 
adaptability. Nobody must claim an exemption, no matter how lucky he or 
she may have been. All who stand to gain from this type of society also 
equally stand to lose. One counterfactual premise (“all are at risk”) is 
supposed to moderate the inaccuracy of the other (“all are agile and 
adaptable”). The resulting synthesis is the pooling of risk under some 
hypothetical veil of ignorance where no person is in the position to predict his 
or her place in society. On the ground of the normative supposition of equal 
vulnerability, the resulting insurance against risk can only be compulsory.42  
Taken by itself, insurance would do no more than provide basic coverage 
against the mishaps of life. But a welfare state moves beyond this level 
inasmuch as risk-pooling reveals how the universal expectations of agility 
and adaptability is prone to dwarf human nature and potential. Agility 
ignores our capacity for contemplation, adaptability is a mockery of the 
freedom that would allow one to be a law unto oneself. Indeed, it is the irony 
inherent in the concept of modern civil society (“the system of needs”) that at 
the moment that persons are emancipated from inequality of rank their 
dependence on the market nexus makes it difficult for them to be who they 
are. Instead of being able to actualise fully their human powers they have to 
reify their human nature into a human resource that has to acquire skills in 
order to serve as supply for shifting demand. The laws of supply and demand 
are indifferent to human biography and aspiration.  
As is well known, Marx observed that the cause of the loss of control over 
one’s own life and the accidental character of opportunities and pursuits is 
the profoundly disempowering effect of competition:43 
                                                        
42 See François Ewald, L'État-providence (Paris: Grasset, 1986). 
43 Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Die Deutsche Ideologie, MEW vol 3. (Berlin: Dietz, 1978) at 76. 
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Die Konkurrenz und der Kampf [der] Individuen untereinander 
er[zeugt und en]twickelt erst diese Zufälligkeit als solche. In der 
Vorstellung sind daher die Individuen unter der Bourgeoisieherrschaft 
freier als früher, weil ihnen ihre Lebensbedingungen zufällig sind; in 
der Wirklichkeit sind sie natürlich unfreier, weil mehr unter sachliche 
Gewalt subsumiert.  
This accidental character is only engendered and developed by 
competition and the struggle of individuals among themselves. Thus, 
in imagination, individuals seem freer under the dominance of the 
bourgeoisie than before, because their conditions of life seem 
accidental; in reality, of course, they are less free, because they are 
more subjected to the violence of things.44 
Coping with the exposure to risk necessitates alienation, and alienation 
cannot be overcome, according to Marx, unless people collectively exercise 
control over their fate. Individuals can live as a law unto themselves by 
overcoming the anarchy of capitalist production and distribution through acts 
of collective self-determination.45  
As is well known, the social welfare state has always been supposed to be an 
alternative to both socialism and unbridled capitalism. It establishes common 
control not over production and distribution, but only over elementary risks 
of life. It stops short of realising a thick human community where individuals 
might be fully reconciled with their “species being” on the ground of the 
suspicion that attempts to create such a community would merely modify, 
but not mitigate, alienation and submission. Instead of aiming at full 
liberation it offers disentrapment or, put differently, decommodification.46 
Instead of getting everyone, potentially, involved in the life of others, it 
promises individual liberation by alleviating the socially incarcerating effects 
                                                        
44 The source of the translation is 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01d.htm. 
45 See Marx & Engels, note 43 at 74. 
46 See, generally, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990) 21-22. 
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of adaption and dexterousness. Unemployment benefits, pension payments 
and health care signal that individual life is not a commodity that society can 
dispose of as soon as demand has abated.  
The welfare state, nonetheless, is consistent with individualism and with 
shifting the focus of life towards the private sphere. This shift is always likely 
to undermine its authority since it gives rise to a plain and potentially 
derogatory service mentality on the part of its clients. 
 
The more ambitious social question 
Even though the welfare state is evidently fully compatible with liberal 
democracy, the social position that becomes universalised as the standard 
position of a member of society is no longer the property-owing citizen but 
the free labourer. The paradigmatic experience is not self-reliance, but self-
alienation. The elementary social act is not freedom of choice but the 
reification of human nature into a resource. The most elementary threat does 
not originate from others pursuing their self-interest but rather from a 
structure of interaction in which one participates and from which one expects to 
benefit. Society is not perceived as the combined and somewhat haphazard 
result of an association of free individuals, but as the unwieldy product of 
man-made, and therefore false, necessity. Using Marxian-Aristotelian 
terminology,47 the social question that formulates an antithesis to liberalism 
addresses a necessity that is different from the urges dictating the lives of the 
poor. It is the self-made necessity revealed in a market-society’s relentless 
appetite for agility and adaptability. 
                                                        
47 See Ekkehard Martens, ‘”Das Reich der Notwendigkeit” und “Das Reich der Freiheit”. Ein 
aristotelisches Lehrstück bei Marx’ (1974) 28 Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 114-119. 
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The partial decommodification of life—its disentrapment vis-à-vis the system 
of needs—is a common achievement. By virtue of being more than a mere 
fortunate effect of uncoordinated behaviour it presupposes boundaries. The 
universality of the problem posed by the system of needs requires 
particularistic solutions simply because they cannot emerge from horizontal 
dealings. If the number of beneficiaries could without anything further grow 
at any time, the reciprocity of commitments would be easily undermined. If 
the individuals whose contributions go into redistribution—the wealthy, the 
healthy, and the young—could easily opt out and make arrangements among 
themselves or immunise their wealth and capital from the grip of taxation, the 
answer to the social question would remain negative. It is an error to suppose 
that the particularity with which welfare states draw on “common 
sympathies” for their effectiveness is a deficient manner of addressing a 
universal problem. Rather, the particularity of bounded systems is justified 
inasmuch as it provides the key to dealing effectively with a universal problem. 
It inherits, dialectically, its universality from what it addresses. This means 
also that a resolution to the social question, ambitiously conceived, 
presupposes the state.  
The change of meaning of the social question from relieving the lot of the 
poor to implementing an antithesis to economic liberalism—the shift from 
natural to man-made necessity—is not a matter of merely looking at things 
from a different angle. It is a historical sea change, which has had as its 
historical background the successful attempt to garner broader support from 
the middle class for social policy.48 It has given rise to a cluster of forms of life 
in Western European countries whose historical significance is not so easily 
erased. In the collective memory of European history it has been inscribed as 
a singular achievement, even though it may well be about to erode. 
                                                        
48 See Judt, note 14 at 52-53. 
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Two types of social question 
 modest  ambitious 
necessity natural man-made 
means poor relief 
social insurance 
and public  
programs 
aim stabilization emancipation 
 
The social question in reflexive form 
Typically, a transnational context gives rise to a situation where openly 
redistributive policies are rarely to be found at the federal level. In addition, 
in all likelihood there exist antagonisms between ambitious and modest 
constituent units, on the one hand, and between a modest federal level and 
some ambitious units, on the other.  
At any rate, this has been the experience in the European Union. Aside from 
regional development programs (and the CAP, which is a different story), the 
pursuit of redistributive policies has not been not terribly significant. Social 
policy is largely concerned with co-ordinating efforts to integrate human 
resources into markets (employment policy, initiatives for “inclusion”).49 
Owing to antagonism among the social systems of the Member States, 
                                                        
49 See, for example, Diamond Ashiagbor, ‘EMU and the Shift in the European Labour Law Agenda: 
From “Social Policy” to “Employment Policy”’ (2001) 7 European Law Journal 311-330; Mary 
Daly, ‘Whither Social Policy? An Account and Assessment of Developments in the Lisbon Social 
Inclusion Process’ (2007) 37 Journal of Social Policy 1-19. 
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agreements on matters such as wage policies, industrial relations or corporate 
taxes appear to be out of the question.50 Member States rather have every 
incentive to manipulate their own legal system in order to attract businesses 
and capital. The Commission and the Court, in turn, develop liberalisation 
strategies and raise the pressures of regulatory competition to the level of 
regulatory disarmament.51  
These factors explain why a modest approach to social policy is not only 
characteristic of the federal level but also increasingly informing Member 
State policies, not least owing to the constraints established by the common 
currency and various instruments that have been adopted in order to come to 
the rescue of defaulting states. This inclination towards more modest 
approaches aside, it is nonetheless the case that a transnational context, in 
which full-blown welfare states participate, has a dual constitution. It is 
composed of political spaces and can be perceived, by actors harbouring 
“federalist” hopes, as moving towards becoming such a space in the future. 
At the same time, however, the transnational context recognises neither 
internal divisions nor common sympathies. There are only obstacles to 
individual ambition. It invites, therefore, social construction from a 
perspective that no longer links practices of common problem-solving to 
particular spaces or pre-existing loyalties.  
A transnational federal system, therefore, is capable of providing the 
institutional underpinning for the actual relevance of two different spatial 
specifications of practical reason. One does not recognize boundaries and 
resembles in this respect economic structures. It is compatible with economic 
liberalism, but not necessarily biased in its favour. The other requires 
                                                        
50 See See Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘The Joint Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and 
European Integration’ (1988) 88 Public Administration 239-278. 
51 See my ‘Idealization, De-Politicization and Economic Due Process: System Transition in the 
European Union’ in: B. Iancu (ed.), The Law/Politics Distinction in Contemporary Public Law 
Adjudication (Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 2009) 137-167. 
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closure.52 A transnational system, as has been anticipated by Hayek, is 
congruent with a type of practical reason that operates in an unbounded 
context and is, in this respect, decidedly cosmopolitan in its orientation. 
Simultaneously, however, it is not inadequate to approach social policy from 
a perspective that presupposes a bounded polity or even to project 
optimistically such a political perspective to the supranational level.  
Both spatial specifications of practical reason—the cosmopolitan and the 
political—have their application in a transnational context. As a result, the 
reflection of the social question can take on either a cosmopolitan or a political 
form.  
In the process of reflection, therefore, the distinction between the modest and 
the ambitious approach to the social question is transformed into a 
cosmopolitan and a political understanding, respectively.53 Nevertheless, as 
the discussion will show, a transnational context systematically favours 
cosmopolitan sensibilities. 
 
Cosmopolitan and political practical reason 
Cosmopolitan practical reason is not tied to the co-presence of others at a 
certain place.54 While cosmopolitan reasoning has to be mediated by certain 
beliefs about what it takes for humans to get along and, beyond that, to 
prosper, these beliefs are not formed in concrete exchanges with others but on 
                                                        
52 In order to clarify I should mention that it is indeed a risk of inclusion that is at stake here. 
Inclusion into a market society comes with the constant risk of exclusion. Inclusion is inextricably 
related to the risk of exclusion.  
53 This is not the place to explain how these two spatial specifications of practical reason 
materialize in different forms of collective self-determination. See my forthcoming ‘On 
Cosmopolitan Self-Determination’ and ‘Europe: political, not cosmopolitan”.  
54 For a clear statement, see Richard Vernon, Cosmopolitan Regard: Political Membership and 
Global Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 37. 
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the basis of trust in expert knowledge and abstract moral principles. This 
knowledge treats human life and interaction as aggregate phenomena and is 
manifest in reliable accounts of the conditions under which it is possible for 
rational and sentient beings to lead successful lives. The knowledge that is 
relevant to cosmopolitan reasoning has as its object the facilitation of 
interaction and the management of various risks. It is universal in its 
orientation and relevant to places only inasmuch as such knowledge has to 
avail of a sphere of application. In this respect, it resembles software that can 
be run on any machine.  
Cosmopolitan subjects are responsive to reasons that have them yield to 
reasonably trustworthy expertise feeding into regulations. Through insight 
into their own limited knowledge, the complexity of the world, the 
increasingly self-contained character of social spheres, their lack of time to 
deal with political questions, and their lack of access to political fora they can 
consider themselves better off when surrendering their judgement to 
administrative authority. They believe they have reason to trust the engineers 
of modern civilisation as long as they are given some choices between and 
among options at the end user level. The availability of choice in the private 
sphere reconciles cosmopolitan subjects with abstaining from choice in the 
public sphere. Political choice is not integral to cosmopolitan reason because 
allowing oneself to be guided by expert reason does not involve an element of 
identification with a community.  
The other spatial specification of practical reason is political. It is linked to the 
co-presence of others within a certain space. What matters to it are encounters 
with those whose lives are not, then, represented through aggregate accounts 
of social fact. This includes the possibility that one will meet and be 
answerable to those individuals either in person or through their political 
representatives. The life of political beings does not take place just anywhere. 
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The ultimate manifestation of practical reason is not universal moral concern, 
which may well inform its cosmopolitan counterpart, but rather political 
judgement, that is, the capability to assess the acceptability of common 
choices from the perspective of actual (and not only hypothetical) people and 
real groups that might be affected. Being reasonable presupposes the 
readiness to yield to the will of others with whom one shares a form of life. 
The reason for yielding is a commitment to the place. It encompasses respect 
for past projects, which have made the place into what it is, as well as concern 
about its future. 
It bears emphasis that cosmopolitan and political practical rationality emerge 
vis-à-vis different institutional practices that account for their reasonableness. 
Given that political judgement has its ultimate focus on self-realisation within 
a form of life one shares with others, it presupposes a unit that is capable of 
affecting and acting upon a relatively autonomous totality. Not by accident, 
therefore, political practice is associated with the state. By contrast, 
cosmopolitan practical rationality does not presuppose a collective unit. It 
merely needs to finds an anchor in reliable knowledge that feeds into 
disembedded administrative-regulatory processes whose jurisdiction may 
even remain indeterminate across various levels. What matters is the 
rationality of the administrative process and not the authenticity of claims 
made by others.  
The horizon of both forms of practical reasoning concerns the substance of 
social policy and thereby, indirectly, the meaning of the social question. 
Cosmopolitan social policy, by definition, cannot be concerned with 
maintaining relations and the integrity of a place. It will not materialise in 
large-scale urban development or planning projects. But it may very well be 
concerned with equality of opportunity. It is not, therefore, in and of itself 
complicit with the harsher forms of economic liberalism. Nevertheless, there 
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are different ways of looking at problems depending on the form of self-
determination involved.  
In what follows, I would like to explore this dual constitution of social issues 
with an eye to what has become, prior to the Euro zone malaise, a most salient 
manifestation of the social question, namely, wage competition between 
workers from more and less affluent European countries. As is well known, 
such competition comes in two forms, namely through the provision of 
services by foreign workers in the host state (basically, the Laval situation) and 
through business relocation to a place with lower labour cost (of which Viking 
is a variation). The cases of Viking and Laval have given rise to a series of 
excellent commentaries in which the respective decisions were criticised 
mostly on methodological grounds.55 There is good reason to pay attention to 
these cases, for a certain type of conflict is represented in the substantive 
economic due process jurisprudence of the ECJ.  
The conflict has more than one dimension. First, its legal articulation involves 
a collision between a fundamental freedom and a fundamental right. The ECJ, 
quite unsurprisingly, lends its support to the former. Second, underlying this 
legal articulation is the clash of interests of the workforces from different 
countries. Finally, this clash would not come about if capital were happy to 
employ labour wherever it finds it at the local cost. But since capital wishes to 
maximise returns by minimising costs, the conflict between members of the 
workforce is triggered by the mobility of businesses. This mobility, in turn, is 
a consequence of the struggle between capital and labour, from which, unless 
labour unites, capital is destined to emerge victorious.  
                                                        
55 For a particularly perceptive piece see Robert Rebhahn, ‘Grundfreiheit vor Arbeitskampf – der 
Fall Viking’ (2008) 3/08 ZESAR 57-65. 
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I do not want to offer another detailed analysis of these cases.56 Rather, I 
would like to focus on three substantive themes that were struck by these 
cases. The first concerns the distributive question of which workforce is to 
benefit. The second is about the Court’s attitude towards struggle. Finally, I 
would like to look at the impending cancellation of the distinction between 
public and private.  
 
The distributive question 
The last group of Member States joining the European Union entered with the 
confidence that access to the internal market would stimulate economic 
growth. Given that their productivity is usually relatively lower, they are able 
to compete with wealthier Member States as long as labour costs are lower, 
too. Of course, owing to demand for labour, wages are expected to rise in the 
long term. It is assumed that slowly but surely the economic conditions 
among the Member States are going to approximate.57 
As is well known, nominal wage competition that reflects productivity 
differentials was deemed to be unobjectionable by the founders of the 
European Economic Community. Changes in the underlying equilibrium 
were expected to be counterbalanced by currency fluctuation.58 It was taken 
for granted, however, by the founders that wage competition had to be 
avoided.59 The reasons are obvious, not least because such competition affects 
mostly low-paid workers and benefits the rich. Wage competition would be to 
                                                        
56 For a prior instalment, see the article cited in note 53. 
57 This is the world-view of the so-called Ohlin report of the International Labour Organsation on 
the social effects of European economic integration. See Catherine Barnard, EC Employment Law 
(2d. ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 3-4. 
58 See Florian Rödl, ‘Transnationale Lohnkonkurrenz: ein neuer Eckpfeiler der “sozialen” Union?’ 
In A. Fischer-Lescano et al (eds.), Europäische Gesellschaftsverfassung: Zur Konstitutionalisierung 
sozialer Demokratie in Europa (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009) 145-160 at 147. 
59 On the following, see ibid. at 147-148, 150-151. 
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the detriment of very vulnerable members of society. It is difficult to see 
therefore, why the burdens of transnational integration ought to be carried by 
them.  
Perceiving such an impact presupposes, however, a modicum of identification 
with the workers affected.  The cosmopolitan outlook cannot take such 
identification for granted. What matters, rather, is a comparison of the 
situations of individuals. Since particularistic loyalties must not influence the 
weighing of interests and the interest of each must be given equal 
consideration, the reasoning is likely to take on a consequentialist form. 
Workers in the low wage economy are in a position to improve their situation 
even if it is at the expense of the workers from the high wage economy. But, 
arguably, this social cost can be legitimately discounted at least as long as the 
latter have a decent social safety cushion to fall back onto. Once the question 
of who would suffer more from unemployment is raised, it is obvious that 
workers from the low wage economy should be given the job. Their marginal 
utility gain outweighs the marginal utility loss of the others. 
I think that the reasoning above rehearses an argument that would appeal 
even to the neoliberal left. Interestingly, however, the underlying 
consequentialism is quite limited. It focuses on the situation of workers alone. 
Evidently, however, the transfer of jobs does not involve a Pareto 
improvement since one party is worse off than before. The situation is also not 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient as long as merely the transfer between workers is taken 
into account. The low-standard workers, at any rate, would by definition not 
be so much better off that they could compensate the losers. There is a net loss 
on the part of the workforce, which is supposedly made up through transfer 
payments (coming from nowhere?). As long as the focus remains restricted to 
the redistributive transfer between workers it is clear that the high earning 
workers are expected to make a sacrifice from which not only low earning 
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workers but others benefit as well, possibly even consumers. But consumers 
are an inhomogeneous group, and it is far from clear whether the laid off 
workers will enjoy the advantage of having to pay less for the goods that they 
used to produce. Most definitely, however, benefits will go to those receiving 
bonus payments at the end of a successful business year.  
As a reason for sacrifice, one may want to invoke international solidarity. But 
it is a very strange form of international solidarity where one set of workers is 
supposed to support others without standing to gain in the future. 
International solidarity among workers is supposed to be to the benefit of all.  
This perplexing expectation reveals a hidden focus on individuals as 
members of nations rather than individuals considered in isolation. If 
individuals mattered it would not at all be intuitively clear that the job has to 
be transferred to whoever is ready to earn less. What the consequentialist 
argument tacitly appeals to is overall national wealth. Workers are expected 
to incur a sacrifice simply because they are part of a more wealthy economy. 
This is a simple reversal of the nationalist logic. They are expected to suffer 
simply because their nation is relatively better off and it is not unlikely that 
they will suffer less than their competitors without jobs.  
It is difficult to see why this argument should have moral appeal. It is 
tantamount to saying that the savings of Swiss, Norwegian or German blue 
collar workers may be legitimately used in order to fund developmental aid, 
which is a good cause, simply because they are members of a wealthy nation. 
They can easily do without their savings. Wouldn’t one have to consider the 
distributive effects? 
Consequently, I take it that even a sober economic analysis of the 
redistributive transfer of jobs needs to expand the focus and take into account 
the overall balance sheet. For Kaldor-Hicks efficiency to be obtained—which is 
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not an appealing moral standard—the winners would have to be in a position 
to compensate the losers even when no actual compensation is forthcoming. 
Once the focus is expanded beyond workers, it becomes clear that many 
others would benefit from the transfer, notably managers, shareholders and 
consumers. Motors for luxury cars are no longer assembled in Germany but in 
Hungary. German workers are sent into unemployment and live off “Hartz 4” 
transfer payments, which are far from opulent. This is the cosmopolitan way. 
Of course, the benefits are difficult to calculate and largely speculative. But 
their existence may be easily conceded. Most remarkably, none of the 
beneficiaries are ever likely to meet the losers: not managers, not 
shareholders, and of course not people who can afford luxury cars.  
The conflict between person-neutral cosmopolitan reason and person-relative 
political deliberation emerges clearly enough. Cosmopolitanism favours wage 
competition. It supports it not least because adverse effects are never seen. 
Cosmopolitan reason does not inhabit political space. People matter only 
hypothetically or in the form of aggregate numbers. From a political 
perspective, however, workers from a wealthier country are expected to incur 
a sacrifice because of their national situation. The consideration that may be 
given in support of such a sacrifice could only be the symbolic advantages of 
scale. The sacrifice is made for the sake of belonging to a “bigger” 
transnational regime. Glory and presence on a global scale overrides the 
realisation of distributive justice. Within a political space, a transfer that 
harms the worse off and benefits the better off would be appalling. It is 
willingly endured, however, by those who accord priority to taking pride in 
their country’s flag. Such transfers, therefore, suggest a remarkable 
imperialistic logic of identification. 
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The cosmopolitan difference principle 
According to Rawls’ classical account of distributive justice, inequalities of 
wealth and positions are acceptable if they are to the benefit of every member 
of society and in particular to the benefit of those who are least advantaged in 
a system that permits inequalities.60 This so-called “difference principle” has 
its sphere of application in bounded communities, more precisely, in societies 
understood as systems of co-operation which one enters at birth and leaves 
with death. Yet, claiming a primary role for domestic social justice in a 
cosmopolitan setting is likely be met with the objection that doing so is 
rearward, chauvinistic and ugly. To assume that under post-national 
conditions the nation state is the natural locale for the realisation of justice 
must appear naïve and out of touch with reality. What is more, there is no 
good moral reason to be more concerned about the folks at home than about 
people abroad. If the poor can be helped across borders, the distributive 
pattern that arises across nation states may be disturbing by domestic 
standards and give rise to greater inequality, but greater overall affluence 
may have to embrace this.  
This is a remarkable rebuttal. If one were to formulate it as a principle of 
justice it would say that improvements in the position of the worse off, 
globally considered, are permissible even if those who were moderately better 
off before end up worse off afterwards and those who were already far better 
off benefit even more. Put differently, such a cosmopolitan difference 
principle accords priority to the lot of the globally worse and worst off even if 
improving their position increases inequality up to the point where it 
becomes excessive, that is, unwarranted by any standard such as the domestic 
difference principle. Such an excess might happen simply because there is no 
                                                        
60 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971) at 78. 
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political mechanism at a transnational level that could dampen its impact. 
While the global poor benefit from the presence of markets, the wealthy 
benefit from the absence of the state. 
It stands to reason, of course, whether such a cosmopolitan difference 
principle would be chosen in a hypothetical global original position61 over a 
system that establishes nation states in whom is invested the institutional 
wherewithal to realise a more egalitarian distribution. It should not escape 
our attention that the cosmopolitan difference principle presupposes a world 
order whose transnational basic structure embraces competition, but no taxes 
and transfers. Domestic political systems are embedded into this structure. 
They represent what Wolfgang Streeck famously called “market-embedded 
states”. In a manner anticipated and desired by Hayek, constraints of 
competitiveness seriously obstructs any domestic attempt to moderate 
inequalities.  
I have my doubts whether parties in a hypothetical original position would 
choose a system of market-embedded states over political self-control within 
limits. The only distributive mechanism considered relevant is the market. 
Already, in this respect, the cosmopolitan difference principle smacks of a 
rationalisation. Indeed, what is remarkable about it is that it represents a 
distributive justice argument which does not in the least encompass the 
strengthening of political rights or the establishment of structures of political 
participation. In a vein that is characteristic of economic liberalism, it is 
concerned exclusively with a transfer of income that does not involve state 
intervention. Effecting the transfer merely requires liberalisation, that is, a 
removal of obstacles.  
                                                        
61 The “original position” is a device used by Rawls in order to deduce principles of justice. See 
ibid. at 17-22. 
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The recurrent appeal to those who are even poorer or more disadvantaged 
than others bespeaks a remarkable reversal of Arendt’s observations 
regarding the force of necessity unleashed by poverty. This is due to what one 
may want to call, modulating Phillips catchy phrase,62 “the politics of 
absence”. The poor are not party to cosmopolitan conversation. They are only 
talked about. Since the poor are an inhomogeneous category and it is always 
possible, alas, to find a group whose lot is particularly heartrending along one 
or the other dimension, there are a large number of people who can be 
referred to as more deserving than others, in particular if those others are 
compatriots. Conceivably, the situation in Sub-Sahara Africa is worse than the 
situation in Moldova; at any rate, the contrast might be invoked in an 
argument about why aid efforts by the Union ought to be directed towards 
Africa rather than Moldova.  
The result is voluntarism. Distributive justice becomes assimilated to charity 
when the poor are not present but merely referred to as potentially deserving 
receivers of aid and when there is no group to whom one owes special 
concern. What is more, when the poor or disadvantaged are invoked as 
objects of concern and there is no sovereign that could effectively tackle the 
problem, one arrives at a quite paradoxical utilitarianism that lacks power of 
action. In juxtaposition, cosmopolitanism and disempowerment come 
perilously close to producing objective hypocrisy. When there is always reason 
to bemoan someone more than others, there is always an easy excuse for 
remaining inactive.  
This conclusion may appear polemical. But the antagonism between 
cosmopolitan and political reasoning about justice confronts us with the major 
philosophical question, which was addressed, however less concretely, by 
Nagel in the essay to which I referred at the outset. Assuming that the nation 
                                                        
62 See Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
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state, rather than a decentralised transnational economic system, is a setting in 
which it is possible to realise justice, the question arises whether the priority of 
justice, which has been held in high regard in liberal circles, is transitive in that 
it also accords priority to its locale of realisation. If so, the antagonism 
between cosmopolitan and political reasoning would have to be resolved in 
favour of the latter.  
I conclude this highly tentative discussion with the proposition that there are 
no good reasons why workers in a transnational system should not have the 
right to stand up and defend their interests simply because they might 
possibly hurt the economic interests of other workers who are relatively 
worse off. In particular, there is no convincing distributive justice argument 
that would make their resistance unfair. It is not rational, in particular, to 
expect that the imperial splendour that accrues from participating in a 
transnational system is sufficient to outweigh an interest in employment.    
 
Struggle 
We have herewith already arrived at the next theme that is of central 
relevance to Viking and Laval, namely, struggle. I do not want to discuss the 
more general matter that a concept, which without anything further was once 
considered to be an elementary concept of sociology,63 has almost 
disappeared from our range of experience. Decades of immersion in the 
neoliberal view of the world have made us ignore struggle as an elementary 
type of action. There is rational conduct, there is competition, which is a 
subset of the former, and there may be combat, at least for a few desperados 
or unfortunate fellows who could not procure less risky jobs. It seems as 
                                                        
63 See Max Weber, Economy and Society (trans. E. Fischoff et al., Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1978) vol. 1, at 38 (where struggle (Kampf) is alas rendered as “conflict”). 
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though what we recognise today is that human action falls either in the 
category of peaceful conduct or outright violence. But there is no recognition 
of struggle. 
In Viking, even more pointedly than in Laval, trade union action is subjected to 
a strict test of proportionality.64 First, it asserted that actions taken in view of 
the conclusion of collective agreement are, when it comes to interferences 
with fundamental freedoms, legally tantamount to regulations of bodies 
whose business is to regulate employment.65 Whatever is done in anticipation 
of a contractual agreement is thereby treated as equivalent to acts of public 
power that are backed up with coercive sanctions.66 Second, the legitimate aim 
that may be pursued by trade union action in the Viking context was 
conceived narrowly. Action has to be tailored to protecting the interests of the 
unionised workforce currently in employ.67 Third, the pursuit of this aim is 
subject to strict scrutiny.68   
Many of the problems raised by this case concern its holding. For example, 
the question whether a consumer boycott of a business that relocates to 
another country in order to save labour costs would be caught by freedom of 
establishment and fail on proportionality grounds.69 The answer is not quite 
                                                        
64 See Viking, note 12 paras. 75-90; Laval, note 13 paras. 101-111. 
65 See Viking, note 12 paras, 36, 60, 65. 
66 I leave aside, for the moment, the assimilation to the Commission v. France and Schmidberger 
situation which might also be construed as a situation where private persons interfered with 
public liberties. The Court played with this idea as well (see Viking, note 12 para 62 and also 
Laval, note 13 at para 84), however, it makes more sense to view them from the perspective of a 
duty to protect the exercise of a fundamental freedom. For a discussion of the resulting unclarity, 
see Rebhahn, note 55 at 62. 
67 See Viking, note 12 at paras. 77, 81. In Laval it was denied that the blockade action was capable 
of pursing a legitimate public interest case on the ground that the system of wage determination 
allegedly conflicted with the harmonisation brought about by the Posted Worker Directive. See 
Laval, note 13 para. 108. 
68 See Viking, note 12 para. 84. In para. 88, the national court is encouraged to inquire whether 
the union would have had less restrictive means available and had exhausted all means before 
eventually taking action. 
69 Most intriguingly, this would also engage state liability for private conduct. 
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clear.70 What I would like to point out, however, is that this jurisprudence 
rests on a profoundly unsympathetic attitude towards collective struggle.  
The point of collective struggle is to compensate for the lack of public power 
without being able to create a full equivalent. Collective action by trade 
unions builds up private power for a certain moment. The economic clout of 
business is supposed to be matched with the power of human association. The 
clash is, put in slightly Habermasian terms,71 nothing short of an encounter 
between the systemic operation of money with a countervailing impulse 
which proves the capability of people to grow beyond themselves only if they 
succeed at acting together. Within the small universe of action, human control 
is re-established over systemic processes governed by business necessities. 
This power is, in principle, generated for the moment and, hence, 
precariously threatened with immediate decay. In contrast to public power, 
which is based upon a legal system, the power of collective labour struggle 
cannot be stored away by means of rules and regulations. It is not preserved 
and readily available in the form of permanent coercive bodies. Ideally, public 
power is always in place. The private power of human associations needs to 
be regenerated in every single instance and has to be surrounded by the 
imminence of something that will be even larger.72 Paradoxically, the 
generation of power only succeeds when it is brought about in anticipation of 
future events. The private power of association is threatening only when its 
reappearance is to be expected, that is, when contrary to its natural propensity 
it does not appear to be fleeting and transcient. The expectation of its future 
exercise can only be given credibility when its present exercise is drastic and 
excessive. Excessiveness is necessary to secure effectiveness over time.  
                                                        
70 See Rebhahn, note 55 at 62. 
71 Siehe Jürgen Habermas, ‘Hannah Arendts Begriff der Macht’ in his Philosophisch-politische 
Profile (2d ed. Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp, 1981) 228-248 at 245-247. 
72 See George Sorel, Reflections on Violence (trans. T. E. Hulme & J. Jennings, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999) at 62-63.  
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For that reason alone, it is more than questionable to confront trade union 
action with the expectation to meet proportionality requirements.73 But even if 
one had to concede, for reasons that I cannot make out, that union struggle 
has to be subject to some proportionality test, it has to be noted that the ECJ 
applied this test in a manner that was particularly inimical to labour, for it 
restricted the legitimate aim of such acts. The flag of convenience policy 
combated by unions in the Viking case may, as had been revealed correctly by 
the proportionality test, in exceptional cases not protect the interest of 
concrete workers.74 The Court did not recognise, however, that the common 
pursuit of such action per se facilitates the development of solidarity among 
labour on a transnational scale. While struggle can create co-presence and 
thus pave the ground for political self-determination, proportionality isolates. 
Such an isolating perspective is consistent with cosmopolitan reasoning. 
Finally, the application of the proportionality principle to exercises of 
fundamental rights by private persons as soon as their acts interfere with 
fundamental freedoms (such as free movement of goods, establishments or 
service) demotes individuals to agents of the public interest. Viking,75 as well 
as Laval,76 confirmed, even though on the usual shaky foundations,77 that the 
right to engage in collective action, including the right to strike, is recognised 
as a fundamental right of Union law. What the Court ended up doing in both 
cases, however, was to confront the exercise of this fundamental right with 
the interest protected by free movement and to submit the former to a public 
interest justification vis-à-vis the latter.  
                                                        
73 It is also unusual by the standards of the legal orders of the Member States. In other words, it 
would be difficult to find a common constitutional tradition for that (unless one takes the 
Mangold style of reasoning as the governing standard). See Rebhahn, note 55 at 64-65. 
74 See Viking, note 12 at para. 89. 
75 See Viking, note 12 at para. 44. 
76 See Laval, note 13 at para. 91. 
77 See Rebhahn, note 55 at 59-60. 
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Establishing such a direction of justification is tantamount to a perversion of 
the interest protected by a fundamental right. In fact, the Court’s way of 
thinking elevates fundamental freedoms to a level above fundamental rights. 
Guaranteeing fundamental rights is per se in the public interest. There is no 
need to justify their exercise.78 What requires justification is an interference 
with those rights. It would, indeed, be destructive of the very liberty 
protected by rights if their bearers had to come up with a public interest 
justification when availing themselves of their rights. Fundamental rights 
would no longer guarantee liberty, but rather individual opportunity to do 
one’s bit in the pursuit of the common good.79 This reflects a pre-modern 
understanding of rights, which was actually overcome by the bourgeois 
revolutions.80  
It may be objected that when the exercise of fundamental rights collides with 
a fundamental freedom, such as the right of establishment, one has to explore 
a public interest justification for the exercise of rights. Moreover, in cases 
where fundamental rights collide with one another there is no other way of 
resolving the collision than by adducing arguments in favour of each. Such 
arguments need to appeal to the public interest since only a public interest 
can justify interferences with rights. 
But the objection characterizes the situation inaccurately. What is at stake in 
cases such as Viking and Laval is a matter that is only very inaccurately 
addressed by the court. The interference with a fundamental freedom (e.g., free 
movement of goods, persons, services etc.) arises because the Member State 
has committed itself in its own constitution to protect a fundamental right (e.g., 
freedom of speech, freedom of association or the right to strike). This is 
                                                        
78 See Rödl, note 58 at 157-158. 
79 The point is trickier than it may seem, for any exercise of a fundamental right contributes to 
the public good of liberty created through the exercise of fundamental rights. 
80 See Dieter Grimm, Recht und Staat der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp, 
1987). 
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unfortunately rendered obscure by the Court’s heedless absorption of the 
Member States’ role as protectors of rights by claiming that Union law also 
recognises these rights. Correctly understood, therefore, what is at stake is 
that the state allows an interference with a fundamental freedom because it is 
under a constitutional obligation to guarantee a fundamental right. When the 
matter is seen from this perspective, the public interest that can be invoked to 
justify restrictions on a fundamental freedom (or even a fundamental right) 
cannot be found in the reasons that the right holders themselves might have 
to avail themselves of such a liberty. The public interest of the state pertains, 
indeed, to respecting the liberty of men and women to avail themselves of the 
right for the pursuit of their own private interest. The interest of public power 
is to protect private liberty as such and not the specific reasons that may have 
motivated the exercise of a liberty. This public interest is of a second-order 
and hence not co-extensive with the sum total of all interests with which 
private persons exercise their rights. It would be tantamount to denying these 
persons their liberty if one expected them to present a public interest 
justification whenever their conduct interferes with the rights or freedoms of 
others. In a situation where potential exercises of fundamental freedoms (e.g., 
registration of a vessel) are thwarted by exercises of fundamental rights (e.g., 
strikes or blockades), all that has to be demonstrated is that a legal exercise of 
a fundamental right is at stake and not how that exercise is not out of 
proportion vis-à-vis fundamental freedoms. The fact that it is incumbent on 
states to respect fundamental rights is Perseus’ shield saving the fundamental 
right from having to face the Gorgon of the fundamental freedom directly.  
What the Court should have examined, therefore, is the question in the 
abstract, namely that this is a situation that engages a state’s responsibility to 
protect fundamental rights. This would have permitted, even if not 
necessitated, an extension of the principle developed in Albany to this type of 
Alexander Somek 
 
41   
case. The Court could have concluded that trade union action, as long as it 
stays within constitutionally determined bounds, unavoidably has market-
distorting effects and hence needs to be exempted from the reach of free 
movement provisions. The Court explicitly rejected this conclusion on the 
false premise that it is not inherent in the exercise of trade union rights to 
“prejudice” fundamental freedoms to a certain degree.81 This premise is false 
because almost any action by unions is likely to impede intra community 
commerce, if even only indirectly.82  
Stating the question in the abstract would have also re-established the 
ordinary burden of justification. The question would have been, then, 
whether the protection of a fundamental freedom is strong enough to justify 
interferences with the states’ obligation to keep its promise to its citizens to 
protect their fundamental rights. By reversing this direction of justification the 
Court, in fact, consolidated fundamental freedoms to the fundamental right to 
engage freely in any transnational economic activity. This is the essence of 
substantive economic due process.83  
I take from this discussion that we seem to have already forgotten that the 
original homestead of the proportionality principle has been the 
administrative office.84 Already its transposition to legislation must appear 
doubtful. In a memorable article, Hans Linde pointed out that even the 
application of a simple rationality test fails to capture the logic of negotiations 
underlying political processes. It confronts legislation with a false and alien 
expectation of rationality.85 This is, of course, all the more true for trade union 
                                                        
81 See Viking, note 12 at 52. 
82 See Rebhahn, note 55 at 65. The question is, of course, whether the Keck doctrine would have 
to be applied to cases that simply affect the volume of trade.  
83 For a further analysis of this point, see the article cited in note 56. 
84 For a most recent reminder, see Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, ‘American balancing and 
German proportionality: The historical origins’ (2010) 8 International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 263-286 at 271. 
85 See Hand Linde, ‘Due Process of Lawmaking’ (1975) 50 Nebraska Law Review 195-255. 
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action.  The proportionality principle has its home in the administrative 
context. Not by accident is it a standard of public reasonableness that fits any 
non-political context. It is perfectly amenable to cosmopolitan practical 
reason.  
By contrast, political practical reason is often enmeshed in struggle, for it is 
exercised not merely on the basis of hypothetical considerations of needy 
people, but under conditions marked by the co-presence of people raising 
claims. Politics is also not exclusively the realm of deliberation and 
procedures. It is not fully compatible with, even though it is increasingly 
absorbed by, the calm and cool world of administrative procedures, where 
any loud assertion of positions is considered to be out of place. Political action 
is profoundly misunderstood when a court isolates the self-interested 
perspective of workers who want to preserve their job. Collective struggle is 
the school of universalization, with the power to establish ties of transnational 
solidarity.   
What Viking reveals, rather, is that widespread collective disempowerment is 
already taken for granted. It is understood that folks merely want to protect 
their own interests. Once more, the cosmopolitan view turns out to be 
incompatible with the political perspective.  
 
The demise of the private sphere 
With the above remarks I already touched upon the third question, namely, 
the disappearing of the distinction between public and private agents in the 
common market. Anyone’s acts may, under certain conditions, be capable of 
constituting an interference with fundamental freedoms and therefore be just 
as repugnant as an illicit interference by the state. In Viking, one encounters 
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this demise in two different ways, one of which is narrow while the other is 
broad. Both are stated in one paragraph of the Viking opinion with the 
purport that what is formulated is one and the same idea.86 But it is not.  
According to the narrow formulation, non-state action, such as the blockade of 
a production site, comes within the purview of the horizontal effect of a 
fundamental freedom (other than free movement of workers) when the action 
is “inextricably linked to” or “aimed at” the conclusion of a collective 
agreement.87 This formulation is novel. It does not actually base horizontal 
effect on the idea of securing equal treatment in a supranational context of 
application.88  
The broad formulation takes its cue from case law affecting free movement of 
goods, which deals mostly with how demonstrations interfered with that 
right.89 In retrospect, the cases are presented as though they had introduced 
the principle of horizontal effect.90 This is yet another instance of the Court’s 
practice of creatively misreading its own jurisprudence, for the prior case law 
obviously affects the state’s failure to protect the free flow of commercial 
traffic in Europe.91 Even though the difference between the state’s duty to 
                                                        
86. See Viking, note 12 para. 65. 
87. See Viking, note 12 paras. 36, 60. 
88. See Case C-36/74, Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405. 
89. See Case C-265/95, Commission v. France [1997] ECR I-6959 para. 30; Case C-112/00, Eugen 
Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich [2003] ECR I-5659 
at para. 57 and 62. Both decisions are mentioned in Viking, note 12 at para. 62. 
90. See Viking, note 12 at para. 62. 
91. Here is what the Court concluded in Commission v. France, note 91 at para 66: “[I]t must be 
held that, by failing to adopt all necessary and proportionate measures in order to prevent the 
free movement of fruit and vegetables from being obstructed by actions by private individuals, 
the French Government has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 30, in conjunction with 
Article 5, of the Treaty and under the common organizations of the markets in agricultural 
products”. And here is what the Court said in Schmidberger, note 91 at paras. 59-60: 
“Consequently, Articles 30 and 34 of the Treaty require the Member States not merely 
themselves to refrain from adopting measures or engaging in conduct liable to constitute an 
obstacle to trade but also, when read with Article 5 of the Treaty, to take all necessary and 
appropriate measures to ensure that fundamental freedom is respected on their territory 
(Commission v France, cited above, paragraph 32). Article 5 of the Treaty requires the Member 
States to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the 
obligations arising out of the Treaty and to refrain from any measures which could jeopardise the 
attainment of the objectives of that Treaty. […] Having regard to the fundamental role assigned to 
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protect and horizontal effect may be imperceptibly thin in certain instances,92 
it is quite clear in both practice and principle. It affects the remedy.93 Whereas 
horizontal effect would give rise to a remedy against another private party in 
an ordinary court of law—a tort claim, for example—a violation by the 
Member State of its obligation to protect a fundamental freedom pursuant to 
Article 5 of the EC Treaty against interference by private parties would give 
rise to a claim against the state. The remedy may indeed again be a tort claim 
against the state that is based on the state’s failure to comply with Union 
law.94  
According to the broad formulation, which thus expands the focus on private 
acts more generally, the activity in question may be causally even farther 
removed from a collective agreement. The theory that might underlie this 
type of conclusion was clearly expressed by AG Maduro in his opinion where 
he elaborated on the horizontal effect of free movement positions.95 In a 
manner reminiscent of nineteenth century Begriffsjurisprudenz (conceptual 
jurisprudence), he uses disparate case law concerning the free movement of 
workers and occasional cases concerning the free movement of goods in order 
to extract the following general principle (at para. 43):  
                                                                                                                                                              
the free movement of goods in the Community system, in particular for the proper functioning of 
the internal market, that obligation upon each Member State to ensure the free movement of 
products in its territory by taking the measures necessary and appropriate for the purposes of 
preventing any restriction due to the acts of individuals applies without the need to distinguish 
between cases where such acts affect the flow of imports or exports and those affecting merely 
the transit of goods.” From the reference to Article 5 of the EC Treaty and the language of the 
opinions is emerges clearly that the Court was concerned with the obligation of Member States 
and not with horizontal effect. 
92. See Mattias Kumm, ‘Who Is Afraid of the Total Constitution?’ (2006) 7 German Law Journal 
341-369 at 360-362. 
93. The matter is completely conflated in the AG Maduro’s opinion, who first (in para. 50) 
recognises a margin of discretion on the part of the Member States and then goes on (in para. 53) 
to claim that owing to the direct effect of purportedly horizontally effective Treaty provisions a 
claim against another private party may in certain instances be based directly on the relevant 
Treaty provision.  
94. See, for that matter, Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others v Italian Republic 
[1991] ECR I-5357Case C-224/01; Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich [2003] ECR I-10239. 
95. AG Miguel Maduro’s Opinion in Case C-438/05, The International Transport Workers’ 
Federation & The Finish Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line ABP & Ou Viking Line Eesti, 23 May 2007, 
at para. 43, 48 and generally paras. 42-54. 
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[…] [T]he rules on freedom of movement apply directly to any private 
action that is capable of effectively restricting others from exercising 
their right to freedom of movement.  
Begriffsjurisprudenz was notorious for reasoning deductively from premises 
that were arrived at on the basis of bold inductions.96 Maduro revives this 
practice. For example, he introduces a condition of effectiveness in order to 
limit the horizontal scope of application of free movement rules by likening 
the impact of private acts to the efficacy of state regulation. He concludes that 
if one strange shopkeeper in England refuses to sell Irish products he does not 
interfere with the free movement of (Irish) goods; he would, however, if on 
the basis of a shared aversion to everything Irish all other shopkeepers were 
to do the same (see ibid., para. 42). The construction is strange. Why should 
the illegality of an interference with rights by one person depend on the 
existence of a number of the same interferences by others, which would also 
only amount to an interference if that one additional person acted as all others 
did? For example, why should the existence of one hundred clever business 
people whose combined acts cause the ruin of a person that lacks a “wealth 
talent” make the act of the last person, and with that the acts of all others, into 
an interference with the impoverished person’s right to subsistence—
assuming, for the sake of the argument, that a constitution incorporates such a 
right? It does not make any sense to approach the matter from that 
perspective. The only difference that the aggregate effect of the exercise of 
rights makes is that it gives the state a better reason to intervene in order to 
protect the rights of others, such as a hypothetical right to subsistence. 
Aggregate effects matter from the perspective of public policy, but not from 
the perspective of an individual right holder.  
                                                        
96 See Eugen Ehrlich, Die juristische Logik (2d ed., Tübingen: Mohr, 1925). 
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Arguably, what Maduro should have said is that as soon as the combined 
effect of a number of private acts creates an obstacle that a trader cannot 
reasonably be expected to overcome (see ibid., para. 48), the state is under an 
obligation to do something about it. Hence, contrary to Maduro, it is not by 
“implication” that the rules of freedom of movement apply directly to private 
persons as though they become capable of interfering jointly when marching 
along with the crowd. The only implication might be that at a certain 
unspecified point the state is under an obligation to do something about, say, 
the collective refusal on the part of English shopkeepers to sell Irish goods out 
of spite for Irish industry and craftsmanship. According to Maduro, the state 
obligation consists of giving free movement horizontal effect. This is the gist 
of the argument. It is, however, inconclusive, for it is open to debate whether 
direct horizontal effect, that is, an obligation to sell Irish products, is also the 
least restrictive means vis-à-vis the private autonomy of shopkeepers who are 
to decide for themselves which variety of products they would like to offer to 
customers. If that freedom were completely cancelled, free movement would 
indeed become tyrannical.  
It does not require any further elaboration that the cancellation of the public 
private distinction, even though deeply problematic, is perfectly consistent 
with cosmopolitan reason. With the disappearance of public acts, private acts 
inherit their significance.  
 
 
 
 
Alexander Somek 
 
47   
The eschatological bias 
Once the cosmopolitan mindset is submitted only to moderate scrutiny it 
turns out to be quite perplexing why there is so little readiness to engage with 
it critically. Obviously, whoever contemplates objections is afraid of revealing 
to himself or others attitudes that are likely to be discounted as old-fashioned, 
parochial, nationalistic, xenophobic, and ignorant of the blessings of global 
commercial society. I sense, however, that more is at stake than mere fear of 
public shaming or reluctance “to come out” when the spectre of critical 
reflection triggers uneasiness and embarrassment. 
In his otherwise doubtfully imperialistic pamphlet Land und Meer,97 Carl 
Schmitt made two observations, which, despite the time and circumstances of 
their origin, are nonetheless worth pondering.  
The first observation is that every ordering of human affairs also materialises 
in an ordering of space. Consequently, revolutions of human societies always 
also involve alteration of our conceptions of space.98 For Schmitt, the rise of 
the British Empire exemplified such a change. The new empire’s element was 
the sea. Seen from the sea, the territory of political rule is perceived through 
the lens of the distinction between coast and hinterland. What matters, from 
the maritime perspective, is, of course, the coast. Schmitt could have added 
that the coast is essentially a place of embarkation and disembarkation. The 
de-territorialised world of the maritime empire constitutes a space that is fit 
for the world of commerce. The visibility of this world is structured in a 
manner that brings busy ports and quick exchanges into view. The metropolis 
                                                        
97 See Carl Schmitt, Land und Meer: Eine weltgeschichtliche Betrachtung (new edition, Köln-
Lövenich: Hohenheim Verlag, 1981). Published in 1942, the book ends with Schmitt singing his 
praise of the German Luftwaffe.  
98 See ibid. at 64, 71. 
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matters, the hinterland remains obscure. Whatever exists in this new space 
exists for the sake of transactions.99  
Schmitt’s other observation concerns the eschatological dimension of world 
history. He mentions in passing that the whole notion of world history would 
not appeal to us if it were not intrinsically linked to salvation (Rettung).100 As 
is well known, Karl Löwith would make similar, however more sceptical, 
observations.101 What Schmitt makes us realise, however, is that alterations of 
the order of space also engage our eschatological imagination. It affects, in 
other words, the spatial dimension along which we imagine better worlds to 
arise in the future.  
Both observations in juxtaposition are heuristically useful. Since the eclipse of 
alternatives to capitalism, we have increasingly come to rest our 
eschatological hopes on the creation of transnational spaces. 
Cosmopolitanism is a vehicle of post-utopian hopes. Instead of engaging our 
fantasy with regard to what life might be like within a bounded unit, it 
reduces our political vision to living in an infinite space replete with 
opportunities and invigorating experiences. The vision is essentially formal 
and linked not to forms of human association, which are by default taken to 
be transient and contractual, but rather to titillating sensations triggered by 
mixing and from encounters with diversity and hybridity. Under the spell of 
this post-utopian imagination we have become disinclined to believe that 
humanity’s future salvation from unnecessary plight might be written with 
national ink. We would like to believe, rather, that peace and prosperity are to 
be obtained in some transnational space. Within this space, parochialism and 
prejudice would finally have been overcome and human dealings would be 
                                                        
99 See ibid. at 93-97. 
100 See ibid. at 83. 
101 See Karl Löwith, Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949). 
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sustained at the proverbial high level of health, environment, safety, and 
consumer protection.  
Transnationalism is a political theology. It replaces a vision of salvation that is 
based on empowerment and collective action with a vision that perceives 
human greatness to arise from horizontal movements.  
 
The priority of justice 
In this sceptical vein, I return to the challenges posed by Nagel’s essay. If it is 
true that one should not expect from a transnational context—at any rate, 
from one in which a great diversity of national economies participate—the 
type of political self-determination that triggers the obligation of justice102 
then the question arises, of course, whether the participation of states can be 
justified against the background of their obligation to sustain just regimes. 
Essentially, this question concerns the priority of the right over the good. This 
priority means that the principles of justice take precedence over the pursuit 
of the economic, cultural or religious aims, either individually or collectively 
conceived. No matter how high the gain in welfare or cultural achievement 
might be, the precepts of justice have to be respected. From this follows, in 
particular, that even if transnational economic arrangements increase the 
overall size of the pie, nation states would have to withdraw from them if 
they engender unjustified inequalities of wealth.  
The priority question is relevant, to be sure, in more than one respect.  
First, the question is whether units which are already under an obligation to 
guarantee justice are under an obligation to abstain from participating in a 
                                                        
102 See Nagel, note 1 at 120. 
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regime with which to comply would make it impossible to fulfil this 
obligation. I sense that the priority of justice would rule this categorically out. 
Second, it can be asked whether in some hypothetical situation prior to 
society men and women ought to choose to create a unit in which justice can 
be realised.103 Remarkably, Nagel would reply that there is no such obligation. 
Just as there is no obligation to enter into a marriage and to have children, 
towards whom one incurs, once they have been born, special obligations, there 
is no obligation to submit oneself in communion with others to public power, 
as a consequence of which the obligations of justice would attain full force.104 I 
do not see why that should be the case, for in comparison to the first scenario, 
where withdrawal is ruled out, it is difficult to understand why the choice for 
or against justice ought to be free as long as the creation of just institutions is 
feasible. Why should deciding against the possibility of just arrangements be 
treated differently from surrendering them to a transnational regime? The 
priority of justice would not make a difference here, but rather one of the 
specific obligations to which it gives rise, namely, the protection of legitimate 
expectations.  
Third, on a charitable interpretation of transnational economic arrangements, 
the question is not whether the right is superseded by the good but rather 
whether it is permissible, in the course of pursuing the good, to constrain 
nation states in such a manner that only a certain conception of justice 
remains workable in practice. This means, in particular, that of all the possible 
conceptions only the market liberal conception would be left over. This would 
be justified if the establishment of transnational institutions were a precept of 
                                                        
103 Of course, this question raises the further question where such a hypothetical situation would 
hypothetically have its place: within a hypothetical nation state or a hypothetically unified globe? 
It is assumed here that the position “prior to society” is also a position “prior to space” and can 
give rise, therefore, to the question, which space ought to be chosen in order to realise justice. 
The assumption does not answer the objection, though, that the relevance of justice may be only 
a consequence of a commitment to bounded space.  
104 See Nagel, note 1 at 121. 
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justice. As we have seen already, such institutions limit the range of available 
social policy options. Within their context, political processes have less choice 
than they would have without them. Such constrains may be just in the 
interest of a regime’s long-term stability and public tranquillity. They would 
also permit a modicum of social assistance. As has been pointed out above, no 
rational liberal society would leave its marginalised members completely to 
their own devices. It would use means-tested support in order to soothe the 
pains of the losers.105  
I do not think that any theory of justice would support such a cynical 
conclusion. Rather, no just society would foreclose the channels of political 
change by subordinating political choices to the pursuit of one single 
conception of distributive justice. A theory of justice, in order to appeal 
consistently to human reason, must make itself dependent on its acceptance by 
a democratic citizenry.106 Otherwise, it could only be paired with some 
version of enlightened absolutism. A transnational regime, such as the current 
European Union, which is structurally biased in favour of market liberal 
solutions, does not fulfil this condition. For citizens for whom political change 
is unavailable this situation is tantamount to living under foreign rule. They 
may decide to accept it when they think that political self-determination is too 
dangerous for them since it could unsettle the pursuit of their private 
interests. It would be surprising, nonetheless, if a liberalism of tutelage turned 
out to be Europe’s ultimate political philosophy.  
 
 
                                                        
105 For accurate observations along these lines, see Abram de Swaan, ‘The receding prospects for 
transnational social policy’ (1997) 26 Theory and Society 561-575 at 561-562. 
106 See, on that topic, the famous discussion of Rawls’ political liberalism by Richard Rorty, ‘The 
priority of democracy to philosophy’ In A. Malachowski (ed.), Reading Rorty (Oxford: Blackwell’s, 
1990) 279-302. 
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Conclusion 
The collective singular “social question” is historically associated with two 
different understandings. Modestly construed, the social question is about 
aiding the poor. Formulated with greater ambition, it concerns extricating 
human life as fully as possible from the relentless demands of agility and 
adaptability.  
In a transnational context, both understandings become entangled in a 
complex relation of both overdetermination and conflict. It is possible to 
reformulate the social question only by reflecting on the broader context in 
which it is embedded.  
Any reflection of this type will draw on either of two spatial specifications of 
practical reason. One is cosmopolitan, the other one political. Both have their 
place in a transnational context. Since the federal level typically is supported 
only by weak political ties, the cosmopolitan form of reflection is likely to 
predominate while political practical reasoning remains local. 
The tension between a moderate and an ambitious rendering is thus 
transformed into the tension between a cosmopolitan and political account of 
the social question. In order to be able to tell which one is to be attributed 
precedence, one needs to turn to the theory of justice. It turns out, then, that 
the cosmopolitan perspective on social justice would not only permit greater 
inequalities of wealth than its political counterpart, it would also severely 
hamper the freedom of political beings to realise one or the other conception 
of justice in their communities.  
Nobody, including the author, will be satisfied with the conclusion that 
follows from analysis. We would like not to draw it and run away from it, for 
we are all possessed by a transnational eschatological bias. We would like to 
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see humanity’s progress realised within the transnational sphere. In fact, 
however, we might do better when revisiting the nation state in light of fifty 
years of European integration. It may not be too late to pursue the federalist 
dream. Or it may still be possible to rescue existing national states by 
restraining the grip of the internal market. Both options, however, are equally 
superior to the status quo. 
It will be objected that no movement in either direction appears to be 
imminent. This objection seems to be a very accurate assessment of the 
current state of affairs. But if neither happens, Europe will be increasingly 
torn apart by its unresolved social question. Lest we forget, we are not dealing 
with a moral precept. As Arendt was well aware of, we are confronted with a 
real historical force. 
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